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Keele University
Since its inception, social work has professed an abiding commitment 
to social justice. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the few professions to have 
maintained	such	an	obligation.	This	pledge	is	officially	inscribed	in	the	
Code	of	Ethics	of	the	National	Association	of	Social	Workers	(NASW).	
This	document	affirms	the	pursuit	of	social	justice	as	a	core	value,	not	
just for members of the Association, but also for social workers in gen-
eral.	However,	what	kind	of	social	justice	does	the	Association	advocate	
and how just is it? While answers to these questions are critical to the 
Association’s members and broader social work community, they are, 
without doubt, of vital importance to those whom social work seeks to 
serve.	This	paper	examines	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	principles	of	so-
cial justice subscribed to by the NASW.
Key words:  social work, equality, ethics, values, justice, rights, social justice
Is Social Justice Necessary?
 We have long sought to perfect justice (Sen, 2009). The jour-
ney so far has been slow and arduous, and it is apparent that 
a relatively large number of today’s pilgrims consider them-
selves to be comparatively no better off than their predecessors 
(Chomsky, 2017). Even by contemporary standards, many in the 
North, East and South would not deny that considerably more 
progress could be made to expand just economic, political and 
social frontiers. The promise of rights, entitlements, opportuni-
ties and resources for ordinary citizens, which were once held 
142 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
by only a small, insular elite, have fallen far short of the ide-
al (Piketty, 2014). Nevertheless, the last man to proclaim that 
the destructive economic and political history of (il)liberalism 
was at an end, Francis Fukuyama (1992), was patently wrong. In 
fact, some have argued that the defense of liberal democracies 
in recent times poses just as serious a threat to civil liberty and 
human rights as has illiberal aggression (Grayling, 2010; Wal-
dron, 2012). Indeed, even Fukuyama (2014) has retreated from 
his earlier exuberance and conceded that political institutions 
in the U.S. are in decay, and as Zygmunt Bauman (2011) con-
tends, there is a real danger of Western nations descending into 
what has been coined “liberticide” (p. 20), i.e., the gradual and 
silent demise of personal freedom.
 Along the path from New York through Guantanamo Bay to 
Abu Graib and beyond, Westerners have become increasingly 
accustomed to accepting ever-diminishing degrees of freedom 
with equanimity. “We have forgotten the sad lesson learned by 
Martin Niemöller, the Lutheran pastor and victim of Nazi per-
secution,” writes Bauman (2011):
First, they took the communists, he mused, but I was not 
a communist, so I kept silent. Then they came after trade 
unionists, and as I was not a trade unionist, I said nothing. 
Then they came after Jews, but I was not a Jew … And after 
Catholics, but I was not a Catholic … Then they came for me 
… By that time there was no one left to speak up for anyone. 
(pp. 20–21)
 Greater justice remains an indispensable, though distant, 
ambition. The fact that justice must be vigorously pursued is 
a major reason for the continuing relevance of social work. In 
pursuing justice, and its more recent offshoot, social justice 
(Barry, 2005), a profession like social work must confront the 
vexing question: What does social justice require? This paper 
examines the official response of the National Association of 
Social Workers (NASW), and asks: What model of social justice 
does it proclaim, and is it just enough? The paper clarifies the 
nature and scope of the model of social justice subscribed to by 
the Association, and contends that it must be certain that it rep-
resents the most robust, comprehensive and generous scheme 
possible. Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice offers such a possibility. 
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To fully comprehend the gravity of the NASWs response, a cur-
sory survey of theories of social justice is first in order.
A Sense of Social Justice
 A sense of justice is, according to John Rawls (1971), an innate 
capacity and natural proclivity. Nevertheless, as Marc Hauser 
(2006) explains, while each of us is endowed with a moral faculty, 
i.e., a capacity that enables us to automatically generate seem-
ingly universal, albeit often unconscious, judgments concern-
ing justice, this is subject to parametric variation in respect to 
culture, circumstance and time. If this is so, then, regrettably, 
our sense of justice and capacity to act on it is by no means uni-
form. Moreover, we can simply choose to ignore our more just 
insights in the quest for personal gain (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). 
History reveals the litany of grave injustices that attest to the 
powerful impulse towards the satisfaction of self rather than 
mutual interests. Normative systems of social justice have been 
developed to curtail the excesses inherent in idiosyncratic, i.e., 
private or privileged, schemes.
Systems of Social Justice
 In essence, normative systems of social justice are based on 
general rules that set out what constitutes the right thing to do 
and a good life in addition to the institutional arrangements re-
quired for optimizing the attainment of these (Vanderschraaf, 
2011). Despite the importance of achieving this aim, there is a 
surprisingly limited range of available systems. They are to a 
large extent mutually exclusive and posit organizing princi-
ples that not only vary, but may also be incompatible with each 
other, in both theory and practice. There is, as a consequence, 
considerable variation in the substance, scope and outcome of 
social justice afforded by them. At the very least, they can be 
either “thick” or “thin” (Walzer, 1994; Williams, 1995).
 Thin conceptualizations are based on rudimentary and 
commonplace constituents of social justice. Although they are 
undeniably limited and narrow, thin forms of social justice are, 
nevertheless, neither simplistic nor inconsequential. As Mi-
chael Walzer (1994) pointed out, “there isn’t much that is more 
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important than ‘justice,’ minimally understood” (p. 6). Indeed, 
this is justice “close to the bone” (Walzer, p. 6). Thick models of 
social justice, by contrast, are more comprehensive and pluralis-
tic. They attempt to encompass differences in subjective interest 
and cultural expression.
 Thinner rather than thicker schemes become most apparent 
in the face of gross injustice. Deceit, murder, torture, enslave-
ment and tyranny are paradigmatic atrocities recognized as 
unjust in most, if not all, social orders, for reasons unconnected 
with contrasting shades of cultural meanings or shared under-
standings of what is right or good. But, minimalism is not, as 
Walzer (1994) made clear, foundational. “Minimalism makes for 
a certain limited, though important and heartening solidarity, 
but it doesn’t make for a full-blooded universal doctrine” (Wal-
zer, 1994, p. 11). Once again, this constraint serves to narrow the 
range of available options. 
Thick, Thicker, and Thickest Social Justice
“To ask whether a society is just,” Michael Sandel (2010) posits:
is to ask how it distributes the things it prizes—income and 
wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices 
and honors. A just society distributes these goods in the right 
way; it gives each person his or her due. The hard questions 
begin when we ask what people are due, and why. (p. 19)
There are essentially three approaches to the question of the just dis-
tribution of goods: virtue, welfare and freedom. Each of these norm-
based models of distributive social justice varies in thickness.
Social Justice as Virtue
 Of the three ideal forms, social justice as virtue is perhaps 
the thinnest. Derived from Aristotelian and Platonic origins, it 
rests on the cultivation of virtues that are deemed excellent and 
merit recognition, reward and emulation. Virtue-based social 
justice attempts to ensure that people get what they deserve. 
Just desert is virtually dependent on one’s character. Thus, a just 
outcome is one in which each recipient benefits in proportion to 
his or her desert.
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The notion that a just society ought to affirm particular virtues 
and conceptions of a decent life based upon these, has an intui-
tive and, despite its antiquarian origins, popular appeal. “There 
is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and 
wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distrib-
uted according to virtue” (Rawls, 1971, p. 310).
 The ascription of virtue to character has served as justifica-
tion for discriminating those deserving access to social goods 
and services from the undeserving. Few, if any, social service 
programs, past or present, are devoid of eligibility criteria re-
quiring value judgments. Workfare programs, for example, 
are particularly discerning about the work ethic of the unem-
ployed. Indeed, there are some in social work who insist on 
the relevance of virtue, and by extension, merit, in ethical deci-
sion-making (Dolgoff, Harrington, & Loewenberg, 2012). 
 This ideal of social justice has inspired political movements 
from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other. As Sand-
el (2010) argues, the notion of virtue is just as likely to find favor 
among the Taliban as it is to the Moral Majority. However, apart 
from the significant difficulty involved in distinguishing merit 
from legitimate expectations, which even ardent conservatives 
like Thomas Sowell (1999) admit is insurmountable, the idea of 
making the distribution of social justice contingent on virtue, 
however refined, would seem anathema to liberal societies, as 
it risks lapsing into intolerance, coercion and blame. Social jus-
tice derived from, and dispensed on, the basis of intrinsic worth 
and moral desert guarantees a maldistribution of social goods. 
It privileges individual virtue and ignores institutional vice in 
remedying cases of injustice (Young, 2011). Surely, virtue is, and 
ought to remain, its own reward?
Social Justice as Welfare
 Approaches to social justice that focus on welfare constitute 
a radical departure from the narrow confines of an exempla-
ry character. They are instrumental rather than expressive and 
rely on reason and rationality as opposed to intuition and aes-
thetics. The most influential account of why and how welfare 
ought to be maximized is utilitarianism (Sandel, 2010). Utilitar-
ianism was founded by the eighteenth century English moral 
philosopher and legal reformer, Jeremy Bentham (1789/1996), 
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and expounded upon a century later by his successor, John Stu-
art Mill (1859/1979). At the core of this doctrine lies a simple and 
appealing notion. Simply put, utilitarians posit that the highest 
principle of justice is to maximize the overall balance of plea-
sure over pain and thereby the greatest happiness for the great-
est number.
 Whereas Bentham (1789/1996) recognized no qualitative dis-
tinction among pleasures and believed they could all be mea-
sured and compared on a single scale, Mill (1861/1979) believed 
it was possible to discern higher from lower pleasures—to 
assess the quality, not just the quantity or intensity of desires. 
However, Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to recast utilitarianism as a 
less calculating and more discriminating doctrine, carried him 
well beyond the confines of the utilitarian orthodoxy, and un-
dermined its most redeeming feature, that of impartiality. For 
Bentham (1789/1996), it was presumptuous to judge some plea-
sures as inherently better or worse than others. Rather people’s 
preferences were to be taken as given, without passing judge-
ment on their moral worth. To do so would be to return to the 
same problem posed by indeterminate virtues. Thus, all pref-
erences count equally. Mill’s (1861/1979) attempt to refine util-
itarianism and prevent it from reducing everything to a crude 
calculus of pleasure and pain inevitably required a moral ideal 
independent of utility itself.
 The pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain has, in es-
sence, retained its potency both as a source of motivation and 
an end in itself. Utilitarianism continues to be a highly prag-
matic doctrine that is entirely focused on promoting whatev-
er proves useful for creating the greatest happiness, or welfare 
in contemporary terms, for the greatest number. The means to 
happiness, for today’s utilitarians, is prosperity (Sandel, 2010). 
Aggregated prosperity makes people better off than they would 
otherwise be as individuals, raises their standard of living and 
makes the provision of social welfare affordable.
 The idea of maximizing welfare by spurring economic 
growth has become firmly embedded in free market societies 
such ours. However, while utilitarianism has led to prosperi-
ty it has been at the expense of deep and widening immisera-
tion. In fact, what was intended to realize the greater, common 
good might be said to have resulted in its antithesis. Econom-
ic inequality, according to Lawrence, Bernstein and Allegretto 
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(2006) is steeper in the United States than in any other democ-
racy. The richest one percent of Americans possess over a third 
of the nation’s wealth, more than the combined wealth of the 
bottom 90 percent of American families (Lawrence, Bernstein & 
Allegretto, 2006). Welfare is undoubtedly becoming less rather 
than more extensive. 
 The fact that utilitarianism lacks moral sentiment means 
that it is indiscriminate about how utility is construed. As Peter 
Singer (2011) recently reaffirmed, “the classical utilitarian re-
gards an action as right if it produces happiness for all affected 
by it than any alternative action and wrong if it does not,” with 
the qualification that “more happiness means net happiness, af-
ter deducting any suffering or misery that may also have been 
caused by the action.” Hence, a utilitarian will judge lying as 
bad in some circumstances and good in others, depending on 
its consequences” (pp. 2-3). What is good and what is right, in 
other words, is not merely coincidental, it can be contradictory. 
John Rawls (1971), for instance, observed that on the utilitarian 
view, “slavery, serfdom, and other infractions of liberty,” have 
historically been regarded as both right and wrong, good and 
bad. According to Rawls (1971):
Whether these institutions are justified is made to depend 
upon whether actuarial calculations show that they yield a 
higher balance of happiness. To this the utilitarian replies 
that the nature of society is such that these calculations are 
normally against such denials of liberty. Utilitarians seek to 
account for the claims of liberty and equality by making cer-
tain standard assumptions. Thus they suppose that persons 
have similar utility functions which satisfy the condition of 
diminishing marginal utility. (pp. 158–159)
Thus, the rejection of institutional “infractions of liberty and 
equality,” should they be recognized as such, are made on utili-
tarian, and not humanitarian, grounds. According to utilitarian 
logic, then, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with torture. 
Any objection to it must show that the consequences of practis-
ing it, will, taken as a whole, cause more harm than good.
 The same turn of logic could also be called upon to support 
a radical redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. With 
so many having so little and so few possessing so much more 
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such a transfer might be calculated to create more happiness 
overall. However, utilitarians can simply invoke the Bentham-
ite maxim that “everybody is to count for one, nobody for more 
than one” (Mill, 1861/1979), in defense of any qualms about 
manifest disparities, and hence, need to redistribute. What mat-
ters most in utilitarianism is to maximize, not equalize, the net 
distribution of welfare. Thus, the principle of utility licenses 
some to forego greater life prospects for the sake of others, par-
ticularly among those who are already less favorably situated, 
without considering this an injustice. 
Social Justice as Freedom
 Like social justice as virtue and welfare, social justice as free-
dom takes the worth of the individual as its starting point. How-
ever, it represents a substantial departure from the former in pos-
iting that each person has an innate right to freedom, irrespective 
of virtue or utility that a just society is bound to respect. Howev-
er, they are deeply divided over the depth of the entitlement and 
value of the liberty conferred. At one extreme are the advocates 
of an unfettered right to freedom known as libertarians.
 Libertarians insist that a precondition for the exercise of 
free agency is the abolition, or at the very least, minimization, 
of anything which might contravene the boundaries of personal 
entitlement and discretion. They are particularly sensitive to in-
trusions into private affairs for the purpose of providing public 
welfare, and are bitterly opposed to the taxation and redistri-
bution of income and wealth earned through individual thrift, 
industry and prudence, to finance it.
 Robert Nozick (1974) ranks amongst the most widely known 
and influential of libertarian thinkers. Nozick (1974) began his 
seminal defence of libertarianism in Anarchy, State and Utopia, 
by declaring that “individuals have rights that are so strong and 
far-reaching that there are things no person or group, including 
the state and its officials, can or may do to them, without vio-
lating these rights” (p. ix). He concluded that “a minimal state, 
limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, 
theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified” 
(Nozick, 1974, p. ix). Anything more, including being taxed to 
help others, is completely unjust; in fact it “is on a par with 
forced labour” (p. 169). State services, including enforcement 
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and protection, are derived from private contributions. Little 
wonder that Nozick (1974) added that “many persons will reject 
our conclusions instantly, knowing they don’t want to believe 
anything so apparently callous towards the needs and suffering 
of others” (p. ix).
 Yet, critics have been no more acerbic about the tenets of 
libertarianism than Nozick himself. In fact, Nozick (1974) felt 
obliged to acknowledge that “many people who take a similar 
position are narrow and rigid, and filled paradoxically, with re-
sentment at other freer ways of being” (p. x). He realized that 
his kinship with these people placed him in some “bad compa-
ny” (Nozick, 1974, p. x). Indeed, it put him in the same company 
as Milton and Rose Friedman (1980), Friedrich Hayek (1960) and 
Ayn Rand (1961). As “bad” as these views are, they have been 
taken seriously as ideals of socially just states both at home and 
abroad. Indeed, the drive towards realizing pro-market, anti-
government ambitions based on them remains strong.
 Fortunately, there is an alternative to the austerity of lib-
ertarianism that retains the primacy of liberty tempered by a 
sense of fairness. Just states, according to those of a more egali-
tarian persuasion, John Rawls (1971) being the most prominent 
among them, are required to redistribute wealth in order to pre-
serve the basic endowment of liberty. While libertarians con-
sider inequality, unfairness and injustice as the simple facts of 
life and urge us to accept and, indeed, take advantage of them, 
even if only indirectly, Rawls (1971) reminds us of an equally 
unassailable fact, i.e., that the way things are now does not de-
termine the way they may yet be. He added that:
We should reject the contention that the ordering of institu-
tions is always defective because the distribution of natural 
talents and the contingencies of social circumstances are un-
just, and this injustice must inevitably carry over to human ar-
rangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse 
for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce to injustice 
is on a par with being unable to accept death. The natural dis-
tribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons 
are born into society at some particular position. These are 
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the ways that 
institutions deal with these facts. (Rawls, 1971, p. 102)
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 Rawls (1971) maintained that given a genuinely equal 
chance to decide for themselves, people would consent to prin-
ciples of social justice that offered the most extensive, equal lib-
erty for all and mitigated impediments, both random and sys-
tematic, that proved most decisive in utilizing it, especially for 
those most hard done by. Rawls (1971) sought to operationalize 
Kant’s (1785/2002) categorical imperative that no one can ever 
be used as a means to another’s ends, even for a greater good, 
but must always be treated as an end in oneself, and for reasons 
that run deeper than it is an inalienable right to self-possession 
and interest. For Rawls (1971), as for Kant (1785/2002), freedom, 
or more precisely autonomy, was as much a moral as legal right.
 Another distinguishing feature of Rawlsian social justice, 
based again on Kantian philosophy, is that what is right takes 
priority over what is good. This is an essential precedent, since 
conceptions of the good can be expected to vary in ways that 
right cannot. As Rawls (1971) observed, “it is, in general, a good 
thing that individuals’ conception of their good should differ in 
significant ways, whereas this is not so for conceptions of right” 
(p. 447). In the absence of any common agreement about what 
is right, people will have no recourse when things go wrong 
in pursuit of their good, as in cases where one’s good is main-
tained at others’ expense (libertarianism) or is sacrificed for the 
common good (utilitarianism).
 Nevertheless, social justice as fairness is not without its crit-
ics. The most frequent criticism is that Rawls’ (1971) “difference” 
principle does not eliminate inequality. Disparity can occur one 
way (favoring the worst off) or another (advantaging the better 
off) (Dworkin, 2011).  However, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice 
was not premised on “flat equality” (Dworkin, 2011, p. 346). 
Rather, it aimed to ensure that primary goods were distributed 
fairly, not squarely, and that the outcome would be to the bene-
fit, rather than detriment, of the least well off.
 Others have been more derisive in their criticism. John 
Kekes (2007) certainly ranks amongst the harshest of critics. Ac-
cording to Kekes’ (2007):
What Rawls calls justice, denies that people should get what 
they deserve, ignores their responsibility for their actions 
and economic condition, discounts their efforts, … and … 
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systematically deprives people of their legitimately earned in-
come in order to give it to those who have not earned it. (p. 52)
However, Kekes (2007) simply highlights what Rawls (1971) tried 
to remedy, i.e., an unequal concern for all individuals. The antip-
athy of anti-egalitarians like Kekes (2007) to proposals for redis-
tributive schemes of even more modest scope than Rawls’ has al-
ready been noted. Whereas Kekes (2007) focuses on the wisdom 
or folly of individual choices, Rawls (1971) is concerned about the 
interpenetration of choice and circumstance in determining just 
outcomes. As Rawls’ (1971) cogently argued, the basic econom-
ic, political and social structure that people find themselves in 
influences their life prospects as much as their individual trans-
actions. It is important to maintain a focus on the overlap, espe-
cially in view of the general shift towards viewing the causes of, 
and responsibility for contending with, inequality and injustice 
as personal rather than political, in recent times (Young, 2011). 
Rawls (1971) attempted to reassert those terms and conditions of 
the social contract that the traditional welfare state set out to hon-
or, i.e., fairness, equity and justice for one and all.
 Nevertheless, Amartya Sen (2009) claims that Rawls was 
only concerned to describe ideally just institutions and was 
therefore of no use in guiding the comparative judgments that 
need to be made to curb injustice in the real and very imper-
fect world. Sen (2009) proposed “capabilities,” i.e., things people 
can do and be with some assistance (see pp. 18-19) as a more 
useful, down-to-Earth alternative. These capabilities are life, 
bodily health and integrity, sense, imagination, thought, emo-
tions, practical reason, affiliation, play, control over one’s envi-
ronment and other species (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). On close 
inspection, however, capabilities turn out to be far more elusive 
and of less practical value than anything Rawls suggested. In-
deed, Sen (2009) concedes:
even in terms of the Rawlsian characterization of distinct 
problems of justice, capability is a rival only to the use of pri-
mary goods (i.e., ‘rights and liberties, powers and opportu-
nities, income and wealth, and above all self-respect’ [Rawls, 
1971] p. 62)]) in judging relative advantages … and that leaves 
out other issues, including the place of personal freedom and 
the need for fair procedures. (p. 297)
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Contrary to Sen (2009), Rawls’ (1971) principles of justice were 
tailor made for comparative “real world” judgments. Indeed, 
there is a burgeoning literature describing various applications 
of Rawls’ theory to actual concrete political controversies. (Sim-
ply type “Rawls” and a qualifier into a Google search for a sam-
ple of these.) 
 Even sympathizers of Rawls’ justice as fairness complain 
about the shortcomings of his theory of justice. A common com-
plaint is that Rawls’ theory is insufficiently egalitarian. They 
declare that it is better that everyone has the same wealth, and 
so share a common fate, even if that meant less material wealth 
all round (Dworkin, 2011). Rawls (1971) certainly advocated a 
complex, as opposed to simple, form of equality in the distribu-
tion of primary goods. However, these were to be divided even-
ly unless an unequal difference in the distribution of any one, 
or all, of these goods was to everyone’s advantage. Although 
his vision remains hypothetical, it is arguably the thickest and 
most practical conception of redistributive social justice cur-
rently vying for our collective attention. 
Social Work and Social Justice
 The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) consid-
ers social justice to be a core value. Challenging social injustice 
is one of a number of principles listed in the NASWs original 
(1996) and revised (2008) Code of Ethics. The NASW (1996/2008) 
makes it clear that the Code is relevant to all students and practi-
tioners of social work regardless of function, context or clientele 
(NASW, 1996/2008). Although it is not listed in lexical order, the 
NASW does not rank the significance of social justice above or 
below other core values. In fact, the Association points out that 
it is reasonable to expect that the place of social justice will alter 
in the face of value conflicts. Of course, the trade-off between 
social justice and other values makes knowing what may be lost 
and gained as a consequence of the particular approach taken 
to it all the more imperative.
 The NASW (1996/2008) states that in challenging social in-
justice:
Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on 
behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups 
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of people. Social workers’ social change efforts are focused 
primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimina-
tion, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek 
to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression 
and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers strive to en-
sure access to needed information, services, and resources; 
equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in de-
cision making for all people (p. 8). 
 The statement of principle is not definitive about the type of 
social justice that social workers are encouraged to pursue. This 
is a critical omission in light of the relative “thickness” of vari-
ous approaches. While accessibility, partnership, publicity, and 
diversity in challenging a lack of social and political capital are 
alluded to in the statement, none of these values is precluded 
from conceptions of social justice as thin as libertarianism. Even 
the notion of “social change” has limited application insofar as 
it seeks to achieve more awareness of oppression and pluralism 
generally. A conspicuous omission is any explicit mention of re-
distribution. The inclusion of this distinguishing feature would 
certainly reduce any ambiguity. In any event, despite its relative 
significance, no further statement is made about the principle of 
social justice. One is, therefore, compelled to look at the imbri-
cation of other values and parts of the Code to supplement this 
meagre description.
 According to the Purpose	of	the	NASW	Code	of	Ethics, the “prin-
ciples and standards must be applied by individuals of good 
character who discern moral questions and, in good faith, seek 
to make reliable ethical judgments”(p. 7) One might infer from 
this statement that the Association subscribes to a conception of 
social justice that is virtue based. However, this must simply re-
main a possibility since nothing more is said about “character.”  
 The Code lists four other values alongside social justice. These 
are Service limiting workers’ self-interests (p. 8), the importance 
of human relationships emphasising partnerships (p. 9), integri-
ty urging fidelity and ethical conduct, competence focusing on 
professional development (p. 9), and the dignity and worth of the 
person encouraging mindfulness of, and respect for, difference 
and diversity (p. 8). The latter also asks social workers to en-
hance client self-determination (NASW, 1996/2008, p. 10). How-
ever, workers are advised that clients’ capacity and prospects for 
154 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
self-determination are subject to compromise. Such advice be-
gins to chart the direction of social justice. The status accorded 
personal freedom in the principle of self-determination is con-
sistent with formulations of social justice that regard liberty as 
negotiable. Only libertarians hold liberty to be sacrosanct. 
 The standard of ethical behavior expected of social workers 
help to further illuminate the nature of social justice (NASW, 
1996/2008, p. 20). These standards refer to social workers’ ethical 
responsibilities as professionals, in practice settings, to clients, 
colleagues and the profession. The notion of rights is a prom-
inent feature. The standards make it clear that social workers 
have a responsibility to protect and promote clients’ individual, 
legal rights. Rights figure in all but virtue-based theories of so-
cial justice. However, according to the Code, respect for rights, 
like liberty, can be tempered. Once again, only libertarians con-
sider rights to be inviolable. There are, nevertheless, two notable 
points of distinction. Social workers ought to advocate “within 
and outside their agencies for adequate resources to meet cli-
ents’ needs, and allocation procedures that are open and fair … 
and based on appropriate and consistently applied principles” 
(NASW, 1996/2008 ss. 3.07a & b respectively). They “should also 
engage in social and political action to ensure that all people 
have equal access to the resources, employment, services, and 
opportunities they require to meet their basic human needs 
and to develop fully” (NASW, 1996/2008, s. 6.04). Both points 
are, at the very least, compatible with conceptions of social jus-
tice based on redistribution. However, reliance on fairness and 
equal access as distributive principles distinguish this from 
utilitarian forms of social justice. Nevertheless, they still fall 
short of such egalitarian schemes as Rawls’. Access to resources 
is not synonymous with provision, and equality, as has been 
argued, is neither practical nor desirable. In fact, as Rawls (1971) 
and others (Dworkin, 2011 and Young, 2011, in particular) have 
cogently argued, equality rivals fairness in profoundly unjust 
ways. What, then, does social justice require?
Which Social Justice?
 If social work is troubled about falling into bad company, 
and seeks to defy current convention, then it is obliged to pur-
sue the thickest form of social justice available. Social work 
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would do worse than attempt to operationalize Rawls’ theory of 
justice. Rawls’ (1971) model of social justice is one of a very few 
with sufficient substance and promise to be capable of mount-
ing a serious challenge to the minimization of state responsibil-
ity for individual freedom and public welfare. It is, nonetheless, 
still not perfect.
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